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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND
RESTITUTIONARY LIENS IN NORTH
CAROLINA
CAPTAIN HENRY LAUERMAN*
I. THE NATURE AND ORIGINS OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
A. Tracing the Res: A Remedy for Breach of an Express Trust
1. Tracing Trust Property into the Trustee's Personal Assets.-
When an express trust has been created and impressed on specific
property and thereafter the terms of the trust have been breached
by a wrongful transfer of the trust property by the trustee, the
beneficiary of the trust may recover the property, its proceeds, or its
product in the hands of the unfaithful trustee.1 As the equitable
owner, the beneficiary may enforce a constructive trust or an equi-
table lien against the trustee's assets to the extent that he is able to
identify those assets with the proceeds of the trust property.' But
if the trustee sells or otherwise disposes of trust property and subse-
quently dissipates the proceeds, the beneficiary, not being able to
identify the trust property or its product in the hands of the trustee,
loses his proprietary claim to any specific assets of the trustee and
becomes a mere general creditor, entitled to no priority over other
general creditors of the trustee.3 The various rules which have been
used in deciding whether or not any specific assets of the trustee
have been sufficiently identified as trust property or its product to
permit the beneficiary to claim a proprietary interest in them are
sometimes extraordinarily complex in their application.4 These rules
* U.S. Navy (Ret.); Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
'Barnard v. Hawks, 111 N.C. 333, 339, 16 S.E. 329, 331 (1892); Ed-
wards v. Culberson, 111 N.C. 342, 16 S.E. 233 (1892); RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 292 (1935); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 202, illustration 1
(1937) ; ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 292, 514 (1956).
'Edgecombe Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Barrett, 238 N.C. 579, 78 S.E.2d
286 (1953); Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Waggoner, 185 N.C. 297, 117 S.E. 6
(1923); Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co. v. McNair, 139 N.C. 326, 51 S.E.
949 (1905); 4(2) BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 921 (1951); RESTATE-
MENT, RESTITUTION § 215 (1937).
'ScoTT, TRUSTS § 521.1 (1956).
'E.g., In re Kountze Bros., 79 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1935); Edgecombe
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Barrett, 238 N.C. 579, 78 S.E. 730 (1953);
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 202-12 (1937).
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have been the subject of a considerable body of writing and are
precluded by space limitations from this discussion.5 The trustee
may have entered into fifty different transactions of sale and rein-
vestment of the original trust property or its proceeds and yet not
disturb the beneficiary's proprietary interest therein. It is only
necessary that the res be identified and traced step by step from
product to product in the hands of the trustee. As aptly put by the
counsel for a trust beneficiary in one case: "We are entitled to
pursue the hunt for so long as we can track the fox, and not until
we lose the trail are we obliged to abandon the chase, call off the
dogs and go home."
2. Tracing the Res or Its Product Into the Hands of Third
Parties.-The beneficiary of an express trust may also follow wrong-
fully transferred trust property or its product into the hands of
third parties. This right to follow trust property or its product to a
third person is cut off when the trail leads to a bona fide purchaser.
In general, one who pays value, without notice of the interest
of the beneficiary, for property held by the trustee is a bona fide
purchaser. Transfer to him of trust property will cut off the bene-
ficiary's equity in it. The rules defining who is and who is not a
bona fide purchaser are as numerous as the situations in which con-
flicting claims to trust property arise. It is sufficient merely to
allude to some of them here.' The purchaser of trust property at a
judicial sale in execution of a judgment against the trustee is not a
bona fide purchaser.' A fortiori, an assignee for the benefit of
'4(2) BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 921 (1951); LEE, NORTH CA.Ro-
LINA LAWS OF TRUSTS 144-50 (1963); ScOTT, TRUSTS § 508 (1956). The
leading case in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 13 Ch. Div. 696 (1879) described and
applied in Powell v. Missouri-Ark. Land & Mining Co., 99 Ark. 553; 134
S.W. 299 (1911).
' Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 539, 541, 64 S.E.2d 832, 834 (1951);
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 202(b) (1937).
" A brief discussion of the law of bona fide purchaser in North Carolina
appears in LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRUSTS 151-59 (1963). See also
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, §§ 172-76 (1937).
' "A judgment creditor, or even a purchaser at an execution sale, ac-
quires no greater lien or interest in the property of the judgment debtor
than the latter had at the time the judgment lien became effective. Such was
the direct holding in Bristol v. Holtyburton, 93 N.C. 387." Stacy J., in
Spence v. Foster Pottery Co., 185 N.C. 218, 222, 127 S.E. 32, 34 (1923)
also said:
A sale under fieri facias is the prescribed mode in which the law
carries into effect . .. [a money judgment]. The mandate gives no
authority to the officer to seize any other estate than the estate of the
debtor, and the vendee under the execution acquires no other estate
1967]
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creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy for the trustee under an express
trust is not a bona fide purchaser.9 A judgment creditor of the
trustee cannot enforce a lien against property the latter holds in
trust.10 An assignee for the benefit of the creditors and a judgment
creditor with a lien are not considered to be bona fide purchasers of
the assets of the trustee because they give up nothing of value for
either the assignment or the lien. Similarly, if a trustee transfers
the trust property to secure an antecedent personal debt, the authori-
ties generally agree that the creditors of the trustee have given
nothing in consideration of the transfer of the property to them as
security. Therefore, they are not purchasers for value and the bene-
ficiary of the trust may recover the trust property from them."1 But
if the transferees or lienees of the trust property have surrendered
old security which they held against a personal debt owed to them
than the law directed to be seized for this purpose. The vendee repre-
sents the judgment creditor, but is not regarded a purchaser from
the proprietor. The well-known doctrine of equity which refuses to
enforce a trust against a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and
without notice, applies only in cases of sales between parties, not to
vendees under executions.
Gaston, J., in Freeman v. Hill, 21 N.C. 389, 392 (1836). Accord Souther-
land v. Fremont, 107 N.C. 565, 572, 12 S.E. 237, 239 (1890); Potts v.
Blackwell, 56 N.C. 449, 453 (1857).
RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS § 309 (1935) states the more prevalent rule that
a purchaser for value without notice of the equity of the beneficiary in trust
property sold at a judicial sale for the benefit of a creditor of the trustee
takes free of the equity of the beneficiary.
'Wallace v. Cohen, 111 N.C. 103, 106, 15 S.E. 892, 893 (1892).
"0Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539, 200 S.E. 16 (1938); Spence v.
Foster Pottery Co., 185 N.C. 218, 117 S.E. 32 (1923); RFsTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 308 (1935).
1 "There is no doubt that a mortgagee or trustee of land conveyed to
secure a preexisting debt or liability is a purchase for value within the
statutes of 13 and 27 Elizabeth [conveyances with intent to defraud creditor,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15 (1950), and conveyances with intent to defraud
purchasers, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-16 (1950), respectively]; but it would
seem, says Pearson, I. in Potts v. Blackwel, 56 N.C. 449, 'that they take
subject to any equity that attached to the property in the hands of the
debtor, and cannot discharge themselves from it on the ground of being
purchasers without notice, in like manner as a purchaser at execution sale
takes subject to any equity against the debtor without reference to question
of notice.' This doctrine is also declared in Sinall v. Small, 74 N.C., 16,
where it is said that the 'creditor who takes a deed of trust is not out of
pocket one cent; so he stands in the shoes of the debtor, and takes subject
to any equity binding the land in the hands of the debtor.' This is further
sustained in Day v. Day, 84 N.C. 408 and other cases, and cannot now be
regarded as an open question in this State." Shepherd, J. in Southerland v.
Fremont, 107 N.C. 565, 572, 573, 12 S.E. 237, 239 (1880). Accord Wolfe
v. Smith, 215 N.C. 286, 1 S.E. 815 (1939).
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by.the trustee and have taken the trust property as new security; or
if the transferees actually give an extension of time in which the
trustee may pay his debt to them; or if the transferees give up any-
thing of substantial value or incur a substantial detriment in con-
sideration of the trust property transferred to them by the trustee;
or if there has been a substantial change in circumstances such that
it would be inequitable to deprive the transferees of the trust prop-
erty, such transferees will prevail against the beneficiary of the
trust.12
B. Tracing the Res in Cases of Unjust Enrichment
Professor Dawson states that the extension of the tracing prin-
ciple of the constructive trust to cases other than those involving
express trusts is by all odds the most important contribution of
equity for the prevention of unjust enrichment. "It emerged from
the fog of eighteenth century equity and in its more modem applica-
tions it is much more recent than the remedy of quasi-contract."' 3
By 1743 the common law courts were using the tracing technique,
originally developed for the enforcement of express trusts in Chan-
cery, in actions at law for money had and received.' 4 This use of
the "machinery of a trust" for the purpose of affording redress in
cases of fraud became widespread in law as well as in equity during
the nineteenth century. 5 Such a remedy was often adumbrated a
trust ex maleficio or ex delicto. 6 Judge Story defined the scope of
the remedy as follows:
Whenever the property of another has been wrongfully misap-
plied or a trust fund converted into another species of property,
if its identity can be traced it will be held in its new form liable
to the rights of the original owner or cestuis qui trust17
"American Nat'l Bank v. Dew, 175 N.C. 79, 94 S.E. 708 (1917);
Branch v. Griffin, 99 N.C. 173, 5 S.E. 393 (1888); 4(1) BOGERT, TRUSTS &
TRUSTEES § 890 (1951), LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRUSTS 155 (1963).
" DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 26 (1951).
141d. at 26.
"See BISPHAM, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 92 (6th ed. 1899), where the
phrase "machinery of a trust" is used."0 E.g., Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N.C. 342, 344, 16 S.E. 233 (1892).
1' STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1258 (1838). See also Whitley v.
Foy, 59 N.C. 34, 78 Ad. 236 (1860). According to Dawson, the New York
courts "had allowed tracing into a substitute asset on rescission of a contract
for fraud." DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICH MENT 28 n.18 (1951).
1967]
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At first some courts balked at labeling as trustee a person who
neither expressed nor evinced an intent to assume a trust obligation.
The counter argument was that an owner should not be worse
situated in court because the defendant had acted wrongfully
from the outset by forcefully or stealthily absconding with the
property against the owner's will than he would be if the defen-
dant had gotten possession and title to the assets by breach of confi-
dence or deceit.18 This latter argument ultimately prevailed. In
Newton v. Porter,19 the New York court concluded that the con-
structive trust remedy could be used to reach the product of goods
larcenously taken. Other states followed suit and dispensed with any
requirement of breach of an antecedent fiduciary obligation to war-
rant declaration of a constructive trust. This is the point which
most clearly marks the transformation of the equitable remedy of
constructive trust into a generalized remedial device, with tracing
as its most prominent feature. 0
II. THE ROLE OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN
NORTH CAROLINA LAW
A. When a Fiduciary Relation Exists
The constructive trust has long been recognized in North Caro-
lina.2" It is an available remedy wherever a trustee or fiduciary
acquires property in his own name in exchange for trust property.
He holds the acquired property subject to a constructive trust even
though he intended to wrongfully convert the trust funds to his
own use.
22
The Uniform Fiduciary Statute as adopted in North Carolina
provides:
Fiduciary includes a trustee under any trust, express or im-
plied, resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian,
1" Compare Campbell v. Drake, 39 N.C. 94 (1844) with Pascoag Bank v.
Hunt, 3 Edw. Ch. 385 (N.Y. 1842). Both cases dealt with an employee's
taking of his employer's funds. In Campbell plaintiff attempted unsuccess-
fully to trace his funds into realty that the wrongdoing employee had pur-
chased. In Hunt, plaintiff successfully traced funds into a bond and mortgage
that the defalcator had bought with the bank's money.
1069 N.Y. 133 (1877).
20 DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 28 (1951).
"1 Whitley v. Foy, 59 N.C. 34, 78 Am. Dec. 236 (1860); Bateman v.
Latham, 56 N.C. 35 (1856); Black v. Ray, 21 N.C. 443 (1836).2 BIsPHAM's, PRINCIPLES o EQUITY 125-26 (6th ed.) quoted with ap-
proval in Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 435, 48 S.E. 775, 778 (1904).
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 198 (1937).
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conservator, curator, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the bene-
fit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or
private, public officer or any other person acting in a fiduciary
capacity for any person, trust or estate.
23
North Carolina courts have held that an attorney who misappro-
priates funds of a client2 4 or a partner who uses partnership funds
for private purposes25 is accountable as constructive trustee. In
Jarrett v. Green26 an administrator wrongfully sold shares of stock
from the estate. A constructive trust was impressed upon the shares
sold to a buyer who had notice of the administrator's breach of his
fiduciary duty. In a recent case, Morehead v. Harris,2" a purchase by
an administrator on his own account at a sale of property in the
decedent's estate was held to be voidable at the election of the heirs,
irrespective of actual fraud, because of the "danger of actual fraud
when the same person is buyer and seller."
The fiduciary relationships set forth in the statute are not all-
inclusive for the purpose of determining what relationships may
justify the declaration of a constructive trust. For example, where
one of two co-sureties quitclaimed property which had been mort-
gaged to both co-sureties by the principal debtor as security against
any contingent obligation they might have to assume, the court held
that the second co-surety had been deprived wrongfully of the secur-
ity by the quitclaim, and that a constructive trust was engrafted upon
the quitclaimed property in favor of the second co-surety.28
The extension of the constructive trust tracing technique to cases
involving the misuse by all kinds of fiduciaries of property en-
trusted to them as described above was only a slight extension of the
remedy from its original employment in cases of misuse of trust
property by trustees under express trusts. The next step logically
was the application of the tracing technique in cases involving dis-
loyalty of fiduciaries to whom no property was entrusted at the time
of the creation of the fiduciary relationship.
1. Principal and Agent.-If P and A agree that A, for a fee,
will purchase X's wheelbarrow for P, an agency is created but not
a trust because of the absence of trust property or res. But, if A
23N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-2 (Supp. 1965).
"Egerton v. Logan, 81 N.C. 172 (1879).' McGurk v. Moore, 234 N.C. 248, 251, 67 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1951).
26230 N.C. 104, 52 S.E.2d 223 (1949).
.2262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
'8 Southerland v. Fremont, 107 N.C. 565, 12 S.E. 237 (1890).
1967]
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acquires the wheelbarrow later, he will hold it in trust for P, and if
A subsequently disposes of the wheelbarrow to C, a donee or a pur-
chaser with notice of P's claim, P can (1) reclaim the wheelbarrow
from C, or (2) can ratify the transfer to C and recapture the pro-
ceeds from A, or (3) can seek damages in an action for conver-
sion.20
In Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg. Co., 30 the selling agent
of the plaintiff purchased cotton waste from plaintiff on its own ac-
count and either resold or processed the waste, earning a profit there-
by. The court said: "It is a recognized principle of law that the agent
who violates his duty may be regarded-at the election of the princi-
pal-as trustee with respect to the property.""1 In Newby v. Atlantic
Coast Realty Co.32 a realtor agreed with the plaintiff to bid in land-
on which the plaintiff had previously acquired an option to purchase
-for the purpose of reselling the land for their mutual benefit. The
realtor did acquire the land but resold it on his own account. It was
held that the plaintiff (1) could recover damages for breach of con-
tract, (2) could follow any fund received by the realtor for the land,
or (3) could recover the land from the realtor's vendees if they were
not bona fide purchasers for value. In a similar case, Avery v.
Stewart,3" Avery had at one time requested Stewart to purchase
Blackacre for him with the oral agreement that for an "accommoda-
tion" of one hundred dollars Stewart was to hold title to the land
until Avery had paid Stewart the purchase price, plus interest, within
a three-year period. Neither Avery nor Stewart had any prior inter-
est in the land. The court did not characterize the agreement be-
tween Avery and Stewart as a parol or oral express trust. 4 The
20 See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 194 (1937).
20221 N.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 818 (1942).
1Id. at 509, 20 S.E.2d at 823.
182 N.C. 34, 108 S.E. 323 (1921).
136 N.C. 426, 48 S.E. 775 (1904).
"However, the headnote to the case as reported in 136 N.C. at 426
refers to the agreement to purchase and hold the property in question as a
"parol" trust. A parol trust is commonly thought to be an oral, express
trust. See Witherington v. Herring, 140 N.C. 495, 53 S.E. 303 (1906) and
Atkinson v. Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 129, 33 S.E.2d 666, 673 (1945). But
"parol" trust may include not only oral, express trusts but implied trusts as
well, referring to the origin and nature of proof rather than to the incidents
and results. Gorrell v. Alspaugh, 120 N.C. 362, 366, 27 S.E. 85, 87 (1897).
Therefore, the term "parol trust" may encompass (1) oral trusts, i.e.,
trusts by a valid trust agreement not evidenced by a writing, Beam v.
Bridges, 108 N.C. 276, 13 S.E. 112 (1891); Shelton v. Shelton, 58 N.C.
292 (1859); Keaton v. Cobb, 16 N.C. 443 (1830); or (2) resulting trusts,
[Vol. 45
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court concluded, however, that Stewart, who had later purchased the
land in question in his own name, held it as "trustee emr 'aleficio.
' '3
1
In Avery there was no evidence that Avery had ever paid Stewart
the agreed "accommodation" of one hundred dollars for Stewart's
promise to purchase and hold the land for Avery. Similarly, in
Newby there was no evidence of any consideration for the realty
company's promise to purchase and hold the land for Newby. The
general rule is that if a promise to hold after acquired property is
not enforceable as a contract because it is neither under seal nor
supported by good consideration, the beneficiaries of the promise
get no rights in the property if the promisor should subsequently
acquire it unless he has manifested an intent to create such a trust
after he has acquired it.36 Although the court in Avery did not dis-
cuss the enforceability of the contract between Avery and Stewart,
Avery's promise to pay one hundred dollars would appear to have
been good consideration for Stewart's promise to purchase and hold.
Similarly, in the Newby case, inasmuch as Atlantic Realty was a
broker, a promise by Newby to pay the customary brokerage fees
might have been inferred and deemed to have been consideration for
the realty company's promise to purchase and hold the land for
Newby.
However, with respect to some gratuitous agency agreements,
North Carolina does not follow the general rule that the beneficiary
of a gratuitous promise to purchase property acquires no rights in
the property subsequently acquired by the promisor. In North Caro-
lina, when one person buys land from a stranger pursuant to a
i.e., trusts in which the intention of the settlor that the transferee of the
property should hold it in trust is proved by reference to the extrinsic
circumstances of the transaction, see, e.g., Nissen v. Baker, 198 N.C. 433,
152 S.E. 34 (1930); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130
S.E. 45 (1925); Harris v. Harris, 178 N.C. 7, 100 S.E. 125 (1919) (where
proof of the intention of the parties that the land was to be held in trust
was a remark made by the alleged trustee to a stranger that he and his
brother owned the land together); or (3) constructive trusts, Gorrell v.
Alspaugh 120 N.C. 362, 27 S.E. 85 (1897). When used in this broad sense,
"parol" trust merely signifies that the trust was not created by a writing and,
in order to prove that the apparent legal owner holds as trustee, the evidence
must be clear, cogent, and convincing. McCorkle v. Beatty, 226 N.C. 338,
342, 38 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1946); Henley v. Holt, 221 N.C. 274, 277, 20
S.E.2d 62, 63 (1942); Peterson v. Taylor, 203 N.C. 673, 674, 166 S.E. 800,
801 (1932); Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 48 S.E. 775 (1904).
136 N.C. at 438, 48 S.E. at 779.
"LEE, NORTH CAROLINA LAW OF TRusTs 21-22 (1963); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND), TRusTs §§ 75-76 (1959); ScoTr, TRUSTS § 86 (1956).
1967]
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gratuitous promise to do so and to hold for another person until the
latter pays the purchase price, "the purchaser becomes a trustee for
the party for whom he purchased the land and equity will enforce
such an agreement. 3 7 Likewise, where one buys land sold under a
foreclosure or execution sale after he has gratuitously promised
the former owner that he would do so and hold legal title for the
owner until the owner can make repayment, he will hold title to such
land in trust for the original owner.3 The rationale of these cases
is equitable estoppel in that the promisee's reliance upon the other
party's promise to purchase and hold the land for the promisee is
said to induce the promisee to refrain from taking further action
to procure the property for himself.39 The promisee's action there-
fore is ex delicto, in the nature of an action for deceit or fraud and
not ex contractu.
40
"Paul v. Neece, 244 N.C. 565, 568, 94 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1956); Lefko-
witz v. Silver, 182 N.C. 339, 109 S.E. 56 (1921).
"Roberson v. Pruden, 242 N.C. 632, 89 S.E.2d 250 (1955); Embler v.
Embler, 224 N.C. 811, 32 S.E.2d 619 (1945); Cunningham v. Long, 186
N.C. 525, 120 S.E. 81 (1923). Earlier cases are gathered in Edwards & Van
Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REv.
177, 184 n.59 (1930).
Thus, RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 181 (1937) states:
Where the owner of an interest in land which is about to be sold to
satisfy a claim refrains from preventing the sale or otherwise protect-
ing his interest, because of an oral promise of another to buy in the
interest and reconvey it to the owner, and the agreement is unenforce-
able because of the Statute of Frauds, and the other buys in the inter-
est and refuses to perform his promise, he holds it upon a constructive
trust for the owner.
Comment e to section 181 reads as follows:
e. Inducing the owner to refrain from preventing sale. The
rule stated in this Section is applicable where the owner was induced
by the oral promise of the purchaser to refrain from preventing the
sale. It is applicable not only where the owner had cash available for
redeeming the land and preventing the sale and was induced not to
redeem by the oral promise of the purchaser, but also where the
owner could have borrowed the money from others and thus have
prevented the sale.
"In Avery v. Stewart, 136 N.C. 426, 44041, 48 S.E. 775, 780 (1904)
the Court said:
If the plaintiff had known that the defendant intended to betray him
by a false promise, and thus to deceive him into the adoption of a
course of action which otherwise he would not have taken, he would
not have placed any trust in the defendant, but he would have ar-
ranged with some other and more reliable person, in order to secure
the same benefit.
This holding implies that an intent to deceive or defraud must exist when
the promise to purchase is made; however, the constructive trust according
to the Restatement will be enforced not only where the purchaser did not
intend to perform his promise to pay when he gave it and therefore was
[Vol. 45
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2. Principal Debtor and Surety.-In Speight v. Branch Banking
& Trust Co.4 a surety had mortgaged her own property to secure
the debt. The principal debtor defaulted in order to cause his creditor
to foreclose the mortgage on the surety's property. Then the prin-
cipal debtor purchased the surety's property at the foreclosure sale.
Although there was no trust res which the principal debtor had dis-
posed of, the court declared that he had acquired the property of his
surety upon a constructive trust for the latter's benefit because of
their fiduciary relationship. A like result was reached in Kelly v.
Davis42 although the circumstances differed slightly.
3. Ernployer-Employee.-Another group of cases in which the
trust res seems to be lacking, or at best is extraordinarily difficult to
identify when the contract is made, is that in which the fiduciary
has acquired special knowledge or trade secrets which he employs
adversely to his fiduciary obligation. Thus, in Funchion v. Somerset
Knitting Co.43 a sales director of a knitting company used technical
information acquired from the company of which he was an officer
to develop, market and patent a hosiery trimming device in competi-
tion with his own company. The court said:
It is an accepted principle in equity that an agent who wrong-
fully acquires rights or property of his principal in violation of
his trust to his principal will be declared a trustee of his principal
and compelled to account for all gains from such conduct (citing
cases) .... If a patent issues on plaintiff's application, in equity
and good conscience it belongs to Somerset and the plaintiff will
be compelled to assign his rights in accordance with the law of
this circuit. Reynolds v. Whitin Machine Works, 167 F.2d 78
(4th Cir. (N.C.) 1948).
44
In Reynolds, plaintiff's salesman and the other defendant, a com-
peting corporation, conspired to obtain technical information from
the plaintiff. This information was incorporated into improvements
in new machines produced and sold by the defendant. In this in-
stance, however, the court refused to engraft a constructive trust
guilty of fraud, but also where, at the time he made the promise, he intended
to perform it but subsequently changed his mind and refused to perform,
or where he died without having refused to perform but his successors in
interest refuse to perform. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION, § 181, comment d
(1937).
41209 N.C. 563, 183 S.E. 734 (1936).
42211 N.C. 1, 188 S.E. 853 (1936).
158 F. Supp. 57 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
"Id. at 62-63.
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on the proceeds of the sales of the improved machines because the
plaintiff had not identified either the particular information which
constituted the trust res or its product as incorporated into the im-
proved machines with sufficient precision to permit the declaration
of a constructive trust.
Not every employment relation creates a fiduciary relationship
sufficient to support a constructive trust on profits earned by an
employee from information gained from his employment. For ex-
ample, in Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Burline,45 an employee of
an oil company acquired information concerning oil properties
which he used for speculative purposes for his own profit. He
previously had agreed to hold any oil property acquired in
trust for his employer at the latter's election to purchase. The
defendant was an ordinary employee with no duties relating
to the acquisition of oil rights and without access to confidential
information. In view of these facts, the court held that the employee
was under no fiduciary duty to the employer and that without proof
of positive fraud, the mere breach of an oral agreement to hold land
in trust does not give rise to a constructive trust."' Similarly, a
defalcating clerk in a grocery store has been held to be a non-fidu-
ciary of the store owner." In determining whether an employee is a
fiduciary of his employer, the courts will explore the employment
relationship. In Funchion, the disloyal employee was a corporate
officer; in Reynolds, he was an ordinary salesman. A constructive
trust was declared in the former case, but not in the latter. Confi-
dence and trust was proved in the former case but not in the latter;
albeit, in the latter case the court chose not to rest its decision on
the lack of a fiduciary relation but chose instead to rely on plaintiff's
inability to trace his property.
4. Fiance-Fiancee and Confidential Family Relationships: Un-
due Influence.-Antenuptial property transfers are a fruitful source
of litigation in which the constructive trust has been found to be a
useful remedy. Sometimes the defendant induces the plaintiff to part
with purchase money by a promise to marry which the promisor has
'"231 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1956).
" See Note, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 608 (1957).
' Campbell v. Drake, 39 N.C. 94 (1845). The clerk was guilty of
actual fraud. According to later cases, when positive fraud is involved, a
mere employee may be charged as constructive trustee. Fiduciary relation-




no intention of performing.48 In other cases a prospective groom
purchases land in the name of his bride-to-be who thereafter refuses
to marry him, not because she changed her mind, but because she
was already married;49 or a newly-wed takes title to property with
his wife as tenants by the entirety only to learn that she is married
to a man still living.5
0
Undue influence frequently, if not always, includes misrepresen-
tations made by the wrongdoer and is generally classed under the
head of fraud. When such influence is "exercised for a sordid pur-
pose it is palpably fraudulent."" It usually is an abuse or violation
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Thus, in Little v. Bank of
Wadesboro,2 the plaintiff was the devisee under his uncle's will,
subject to his father's appointment as managing trustee of the prop-
erty. In response to persistent threatening and intimidation by his
father at a time when the plaintiff was an alcoholic and drug addict,
the plaintiff was coerced into conveying the property to a younger
brother. In its opinion the Court said:
While undue influence in an action to set aside a deed does
not necessarily include moral turpitude... when the deed is the
result of a dominant influence exercised over the mind of another,
so that the mind of the grantor is ... supplanted and the deed
expresses the will of the actor procuring the result, the deed so
obtained is not improperly termed fraudulent.
53
In an appropriate case a devise as well as a conveyance may be
set aside, and a constructive trust may be impressed upon property
obtained by undue influence. In Bohannon v. Trotman,"4 the plain-
tiff succeeded in having a constructive trust declared on property
devised and bequeathed under a will to others on the ground that
they had exercised undue influence over the testator. The case is
noteworthy because a constructive trust was impressed on property
in which the plaintiff had only an expectancy at the time the undue
influence was exercised on the testatorD5
" Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N.C. 342, 16 S.E. 233 (1892).
"'Wood v. Massingill, 243 N.C. 625, 91 S.E.2d 588 (1956).
'o Lawrence v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950).
51 Plemmons v. Murphy, 176 N.C. 671, 678-79, 97 S.E. 648, 651 (1918).
82187 N.C. 1, 121 S.E. 185 (1924).
Id. at 5, 121 S.E. at 187, quoting Myatt v. Myatt, 149 N.C. 137, 62
S.E. 887 (1908).
1'214 N.C. 706, 200 S.E. 852 (1939).
" See Greensboro Bank v. Scott, 184 N.C. 312, 114 S.E. 475 (1922),
where the court also enforced a constructive trust in favor of the holder of
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Wherever a fiduciary relation exists between two or more per-
sons, the court will not hesitate to call a person chargeable with a
breach of duty to account. In Anderson Cotton Mills v. Royal Mfg.
Co.,"0 the court said:
If a factor or agent or other person in a fiduciary position ac-
quires any pecuniary advantage to himself through the medium
of his fiduciary character, he is accountable as a constructive trust-
ee for those profits to his employer or other person whose inter-
ests he was bound to advance.
57
If there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties
established by an agreement or otherwise, there need have been no
trust res in existence at the time the fiduciary relationship was cre-
ated in order to support a subsequent constructive trust. It is enough
if the fiduciary or confidant has acquired any pecuniary advantage
to himself through his special relationship. Hence, a constructive
trust in North Carolina is primarily a tool to enforce fiduciary duty.
B. When No Fiduciary or Confidential Relationship Exists:
Fraud and Constructive Fraud in Equity
It used to be said that the best hint as to the substantive juris-
diction of chancery was given by the words "fraud, accident, and
breach of confidence.""8 Except for the tort action of deceit, the
courts of law exercised almost no affirmative jurisdiction in these
areas for hundreds of years after the old action at law of account
had fallen into disuse in the fifteenth century.59 Deceit--common
law fraud-is an oral misrepresentation or a course of conduct calcu-
lated to create a misapprehension or to induce an erroneous con-
a mere contingency interest in the property. But in that case the beneficiary
of the constructive trust had promised to refrain from doing something he
had a right to do in exchange for the property he sought to possess. In the
instant case the plaintiff had given no consideration, other than filial affec-
tion, for the unrealized legacy.
M221 N.C. 500, 20 S.E.2d 818 (1942).
Id. at 511, 20 S.E.2d at 824. (Emphasis added.)
MAITLAND, EQUITY 8 (1909).
AMES, CASES ON TRUSTS 1-8 (1898); DAWSON, CASES ON RESTITUTION
65 n.12 (1958). But much of that jurisdiction has been reasserted by courts
of law even in jurisdictions where actions at law and equity are still differ-
entiated. Today, the obligation of a fiduciary not to make a personal profit
out of the fiduciary relationship can be enforced in quasi-contract. Waters v.
Boyden, 275 Mass. 564, 176 N.E. 610 (1931).
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clusion or inference that induces a person to act or forebear from
acting with reference to property or a legal right to his detriment."0
The action is in tort and proof of all of the elements is difficult.
Usually, mere non-disclosure of a fact would not support the action.6"
The rule was caveat emptor.62 Only loss-of-bargain money damages
-the difference between the value of the property as represented by
the defendant and its actual value-were awarded. It was not until
the middle of the eighteenth century that an action at law quasi ex
contractu for a "restitutionary" money judgment could be brought
by a party seeking affirmative relief from a simple contract because
of alleged overreaching of the other party, for conduct equivalent to
or short of deceit, that resulted in his acquisition of a benefit which
it would be unjust for him to retain. 3 Even then, only equity
could give affirmative relief to a party who was bound by his seal,
except in those cases wherein the fraud went to the nature of in-
strument sealed by the obligor (fraud in the factum as distinguished
from fraud in the inducement.)6 In addition to the limitations
imposed by the common law courts on the granting of affirmative
relief from fraudulent transactions, stringent restrictions were
placed on the interposition of the defense of fraud or mistake in
actions at law. Caveat emptor was a rule of common law, and a
defense to an action in contract based on fraud, undue influence or
6 Mitchell v. Strickland, 207 N.C. 141, 143, 176 S.E. 468, 470 (1934).
A more detailed definition of legal fraud appears in the RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION § 8 (1937).
" E.g., Iron City Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, Du Pay & Co., 194 Pa. 204, 44
Ati. 1066 (1899). The law of North Carolina has been otherwise for many
years. Case v. Edney, 26 N.C. 93 (1843); Cobb v. Fogalman, 23 N.C. 440
(1841). The tendency today is to permit recovery for fraud from one who
is under a moral obligation to disclose but is silent. PROSSER, TORTS 712 (3d
ed. 1964).
'2 Of course, if the seller gave an express warranty, an action in as-
sumpsit for breach thereof would lie. For an account of the development
of the law of deceit and breach of warranty, see 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 377-82 (1924); 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABIL-
ITY 377-82 (1906).
" Moses v. MacFerlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (1760).
The development of the action quasi ex contracu to prevent unjust enrich-
ment may be found in Ames, History of Assumpsit, in 3 SELECT ESSAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 261 (1909).
" Thus Chitty states: "The law has prescribed different forms of action
on different securities. Thus assumpsit cannot in general be supported when
there has been an express contract under seal or of record which relates
to the same subject matter and is still in force; but the party must proceed
in debt or covenant when the contract is under seal." 1 CHITTY, PLEADING
103 (1805).
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mistake was triable in most jurisdictions only in equity."5 Hence, in
the courts of chancery there developed through the centuries a sub-
stantial body of "uncommon" law relating to deceptive and unfair
conduct ranging from common law deceit to mere overreaching by
one party because of the other's ignorance or mistake.
Fraud or constructive fraud in equity practice came to mean a
breach of legal or equitable duty, regardless of moral guilt of the
fraud-feasor, that the chancellor declared fraudulent because of its
tendency to deceive others, violate public or private confidence, or
injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of purpose nor
intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud.6 6 Con-
structive fraud embraces different grades of wrong. It embraces
contracts illegal and therefore void at law as well as in equity; trans-
actions voidable in equity because of public policy; and transactions
which merely raise a presumption of wrong and throw upon the
party benefited by the transaction the burden of proving his inno-
cence and the absence of fault.67 One of the kinds of censorious
conduct comprehended by the term "constructive fraud" is breach
of a fiduciary relationship such as has been described previously.
For example, in Morehead v. Harris68 when the administrator pur-
chased property from the decedent's estate, an action for damages
could not have been brought because the court did not find that he
had in fact harmed the estate. Nevertheless, a constructive trust
was fastened onto the property purchased by the administrator. It
was enough that there was "danger of harm." In Speight v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co. the court said of the conduct of a surety:
"There is latent perhaps, but none the less real, the necessary element
of that unconscious conduct which equity calls constructive fraud."69
"Kelly v. Hurt, 74 Mo. 561, 570 (1881); New York v. Holzberger, 44
Misc. 509, 90 N.Y. Supp. 63 (Sup. Ct. 1904). In England equity had ex-
clusive jurisdiction of such defenses until the Common Law Procedure Act,
17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 (1845). A defendant who raised an equitable defense
in an action at law could petition equity to enjoin the action until the
equitable right had been determined. If the petition was granted, a "common"
injunction would go out to the law court. 2 McINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 403 (1956).
"' Priddy v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 258 N.C. 653, 658, 129 S.E.2d 256,
261 (1963); MCCLINTOcK, EQUITY 215 (1956).
("Balthrop v. Todd, 145 N.C. 112, 58 S.E. 996 (1907); 3 SYmONS,
POMEROY's EQUITY 626 (1941).
262 N.C. 330, 335, 137 S.E.2d 174, 180 (1964).
209 N.C. 563, 566, 183 S.E. 734, 736 (1936).
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C. The Constructive Trust: A Remedy for
Wrongdoing by a Non-Fiduciary
In Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Waggoner,70 the defendants connived
with the bookkeeper of the bank to conceal overdrafts on their ac-
count in order to permit them to purchase mules for resale in their
business as livestock dealers. The court held that the funds fraudu-
lently obtained were impressed with a constructive trust and that the
bank could follow them into the product, the mules. The court
quoted the following excerpt from Singer Mfg. Co. v. Summers.71
Where a man's property has been obtained by actionable fraud
or covin, the owner can follow and recover it from the wrong-
doer as long as he can identify or trace it. And the right attaches
not only to the wrongdoer himself but to anyone to whom the
property has been transferred otherwise than in good faith and
for valuable consideration, and applies not only to specific prop-
erty but to choses in action.72
Another relatively common type of case of fraudulently induced
arm's length transfer is that in which an insolvent buyer induces a
merchant to sell him goods upon his representations of solvency.
Goods or their product so obtained may be impressed with a con-
structive trust.78
In these latter two cases and those which follow immediately, a
transfer of property from the plaintiff to the defendant has been
induced by the fraudulent representation of the latter under circum-
stances which might support an action in tort for deceit. The parties
are dealing at arm's length; there is no pretense of a fiduciary
relation. Therefore, in certain cases the remedy of constructive trust
may be applied where there is no underlying trust or fiduciary rela-
tionship provided there has been an unjust enrichment of the wrong-
doer.74
1. Insolvent Debtor-Creditor.-A constructive trust is apt to be
10185 N.C. 297, 117 S.E. 6 (1923).
11143 N.C. 102, 55 S.E. 522 (1906).
185 N.C. at 301, 117 S.E. at 8.
"a Wallace, Elliot & Co. v. Cohen, 111 N.C. 103, 15 S.E. 892 (1892);
Des Farges v. Pugh, 93 N.C. 31 (1885); See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-702. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-702.
"Cf. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160 which states, "Where a person
holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to
retain it, a constructive trust arises."
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declared whenever a non-fiduciary, insolvent debtor has transferred
property in fraud of his creditors in violation of section 39-15 of
the General Statutes of North Carolina 5 which declares that certain
transfers of property shall be void as to creditors. Thus, in Michael
v. Moore,"0 the defendant's husband had himself been a defendant
some years earlier in a suit for malicious prosecution. During the
pendency of this earlier suit he had mortgaged his property and
handed over the proceeds to his wife who in turn had used the
money to improve her separate property. When the plaintiff sought
to enforce the judgment in this action against the wife, the court
declared that the proceeds of the mortgage so invested are "regarded
as a personal fund fraudulently withdrawn from the husband's
creditors"77 and held the wife's property subject to an equitable lien
in an amount equal to the increase in value of the property.78
2. Vendors and Sellers as Constructive Trustees Under Execu-
tory Sales Contracts.-At times the courts refer to the vendor in
possession of land under an executory contract to convey as "trust-
ee" for the purchaser because the vendor must not commit waste
nor diminish the estate and must convey it to the purchaser when
the latter tenders performance according to the terms of the con-
tract.70 The trust terminology reflects the fiction of equitable con-
version whereby the execution of the contract of sale of realty
"converts" the vendor's interest from realty to personalty, and the
purchaser's money or promise to pay into the equitable interest in
the land."' It is but a short step to the further conclusion that the
-(1950).
" 157 N.C. 462, 73 S.E. 104 (1911).
Id. at 467, 73 S.E. at 106.
Id. at 469-70, 73 S.E. at 107. The court applied the rule that a con-
structive trust would be applied only to that portion of the res or its product
which was clearly identifiable. This could only be the net increase in value
of the wife's property after the improvements had been made, irrespective of
the amount of her husband's money invested in the improvements. See, New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 196 F. Supp. 780 (M.D.N.C. 1961), reversed
on other grounds, 301 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1962); Fulp v. Fulp, 264 N.C. 20,
140 S.E.2d 708 (1965); Henderson v. Hoke, 21 N.C. 119 (1835).
" E.g., House v. Dexter, 9 Mich. 246 (1861) "[Equity] considers the
vendor as to the land a trustee for the purchaser. . . ." In Chandler v.
Cameron, 229 N.C. 62, 47 S.E.2d 528, (1948), a tenant in common who,
without knowledge or authorization of his co-tenants, contracted to convey
standing timber on the entire tract to another and later acquired an addi-
tional interest in the tract was said by the court to hold the standing timber
on the after acquired interest in trust for the original purchaser."Woodward v. Ball, 188 N.C. 505, 125 S.E. 10 (1924).
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vendor holds title and possession in trust for the purchaser. The
validity of this conclusion is questionable,"' but there is no doubt
that a vendor who subsequently conveys title to land under contract
to a grantee other than the contract purchaser holds the proceeds of
such subsequent conveyance for the contract purchaser and the latter
is entitled to any profits or income occurring therefrom.s2 In other
words, the remedy for a wrongful transfer of title to land already
under contract to be sold is the declaration of a constructive trust on
the proceeds even though the vendor, strictly speaking, is not a
trustee of the land for the purchaser.
As between the buyer and seller of goods, the general rule was
that title did not pass from the seller to the buyer under a contract
of sale until the contract had been fully executed; that is, until all of
the stipulations in the contract were performed or performance with
readiness and ability was tendered and refused, 8 or as the parties
otherwise manifestly intended.8 4 Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, however, a buyer of goods "identified" to an executory con-
tract of sale obtains a "special property" in them, 5 and if (1) he
"1The rights and duties of the vendor with respect to the land under
contract are not those of a trustee under an express trust or a resulting
trust. The vendor still "has a personal interest in the land; he is entitled
to its rents, issues and profits until the date of performance; he holds the
title as security for the payment of the purchase price; the proceeds of the
insurance effected by him he holds for his own benefit .... The vendee, on
the other hand, is a mere debtor. He holds no specific property for the
vendor, and his sole obligation .. . is to pay the purchase money on the
conveyance of the vendor's title." Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract,
13 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 372-73 (1913).82Taylor v. Kelly, 56 N.C. 233, 240 (1857).
8' C. B. Coles & Sons Co. v. Standard Lumber Co., 150 N.C. 183, 63 S.E.
736 (1909)."' Watts v. Norfolk Southern R.R., 183 N.C. 12, 110 S.E. 582 (1922);
Richardson v. Woodruff & Sons, 178 N.C. 46, 100 S.E. 173 (1919). See 46
AM. JuR., SALES, §§ 411-15 (1943).
"8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-501; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-501,
provides for identification as follows:
(1) .... In the absence of specific agreement identification occurs
(a) when the contract is made if it is for the sale of goods
already existing and identified;
(b) if the contract is for the sale of future goods other than
those described in the paragraph (c), when goods are shipped, marked,
or otherwise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract
refers;
(c) when the crops are planted or otherwise become growing
crops or the young are conceived if the contract is for the sale of
unborn young to be born within twelve months after contracting or
for the sale of crops to be harvested within twelve months or the
next normal harvest season after whichever is longer."
1967]
442 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45
has paid a part of the purchase price and (2) the seller becomes
insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment on
their price, the buyer, on making tender of the balance of the pur-
chase price, may enforce the contract specifically and obtain the
goods from the seller."' With respect to the seller and his creditors
on the one hand and a buyer on the other, the "special property"
right created by the Code could well be called an "equitable con-
version" whereby the buyer's obligation to pay is converted into a
special property in the goods themselves in a way analogous to
equitable conversion under contracts for the sale of realty. In the
event an insolvent seller has disposed of the goods under contract
by selling them again to a third person, the buyer's special prop-
erty in the goods thus wrongfully resold should permit the buyer
to impress a constructive trust upon the proceeds of such sale identi-
fiable as such in the hands of the seller so an to give the disappointed
buyer a claim upon these proceeds in preference to general creditors
of the seller, even those whose claims were prior in point of time; or,
in the alternative, should permit the aggrieved buyer to recover the
goods themselves from any transferee who is not a bona fide pur-
chaser.
8 7
This right of the buyer to a "special property" in goods still in
possession of the seller but identified to a sales contract is in deroga-
tion of the common law s and of the general rules laid down in the
" UNIFORM COM!MERCIAL CODE § 2-502; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-502.
Section 1-201 (23) provides, "(23) A person is insolvent who either has
ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot pay his
debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal
bankruptcy law."
Such a broad definition of insolvency would appear to facilitate the application
of section 2-502 by lessening the evidence required to establish a prima facie
case that the seller was in fact insolvent within ten days after payment of
the first installment. However, to date section 2-502 has not been litigated.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATED § 2-502; Kennedy, Reclam-
tion of Goods Sold by a Bankrupt Seller, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 556 (1960);
Note, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1955).
See Note, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 101 (1955).
a At common law it was thought that the buyer and seller, by agreeing
to allow the seller to remain in possession of the goods after they had been
identified to the contract and part of the purchase price paid had created the
appearance that the seller still owned the goods-a circumstance likely to
prejudice any creditor who might rely on this apparent ownership. "Posses-
sion with the appearance of ownership renders the property liable for the
debts of the possessor to those who gave him credit on the faith of it."
Ryall v. Rowles, 1 Ves. Sr. 348, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1749). See 1 GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & PREFERENCES §§ 341-43c (1940). The UNI-
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Uniform Commercial Code prescribing when the title of property in
the goods passes from seller to buyer.5 9 Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that, except as provided in section 2-502 of the Code, the
buyer of goods under a wholly or partly executory contract of sale
can have no claim against an insolvent, defaulting seller other than
an action for money damages. 0
3. Constructive Trust-A Remedy for Accident and Mistake.-
Breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and undue influence imply moral
turpitude, but a constructive trust may also be imposed when title
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-402(1); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-2-402(1), recog-
nizes the common law rule. It provides:
(1) A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of
goods to a contract of sale as void if as against him a retention of
possession by the seller is fraudulent under any rule of law of the
state where the goods are situated, except that retention of possession
in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a
commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification is not
fraudulent.
This section is intended to relax the common law in many states that a
retention of possession by the seller is per se fraudulent as to creditors.
This, however, has not been the rule in North Carolina where retention of
possession by the seller is only prima facie fraud, that is, it is sufficient
evidence to carry the case to the jury on the issue of the seller's fraud.
Howell v. Elliott, 12 N.C. 76 (1826). See Note, 104 U. PA. L. Rxv. 91, 97
(1955).
8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401; N.C. GEM. STAT. § 25-2-401.
Paragraph (1) states in part, "(1) Title to goods cannot pass under a con-
tract of sale prior to their identification to the contract, and, unless other-
wise explicitly agreed, the buyer acquires by their identification a special
property as limited by this act .... ." Comment 3 states: "The special prop-
erty of the buyer in goods is excluded from the security interest." (Empha-
sis added.) A grasp of the distinction between a property interest and a
security interest is essential to an understanding of the law of constructive
trust. A constructive trust conceptually is a remedy for the invasion of a
proprietary or property interest. It is not a device for enforcing a lien or
other security interest. See text accompanying notes 108-119.
'0 The writer is aware that the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-716(1)
states, "(1) Specific performance may be decreed where goods are unique or
in other proper circumstances." Comment 4 of the Code states that this sec-
tion is intended to give the buyer rights to the goods comparable to the seller's
rights to the price. In turn, the seller's rights to the price under an executory
contract of sale are enforceable only by an action for money damages. He has
no property interest in any particular funds in the hands of the buyer. Hence,
the writer believes that section 2-716(1) of itself merely gives the buyer a
personal action against the seller for recovery of the specific goods and gives
the buyer no interest in the proceeds of the sale of the goods to a third party.
If the buyer has transferred the goods to a third person including an assignee
for the benefit of creditors or a trustee in bankruptcy, this section does not
give the buyer the right to follow the goods and recover them and therefore
section 2-716(1) is not a basis for the declaration of the seller as a con-
structive trustee for the buyer.
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has passed by accident or mistake. For example, in Greensboro
Bank v. Scott,"1 an uncle agreed to pay his nephew $10,000 if he
abstained from alcohol for five years. Two years later the uncle
purchased a house for the nephew and his wife with the under-
standing that the purchase was in lieu of the $10,000 obligation.
The uncle took the title in his own name to hold it, apparently, until
the five-year period was up. But before the five-year period had
expired, the uncle died. In an action against the uncle's heirs, the
court held that the uncle held the land under an implied trust al-
though the nephew had only a contingent right in the property when
the uncle died. The accident of death whereby the trust property
descended by law to the estate's heirs could not defeat the nephew's
contingent interest in his uncle's property. 2
Similarly, when property is transferred or money paid by mis-
take, a constructive trust may be impressed upon the property in
the hands of the transferee. Thus, when the holder of a mortgage
note endorsed the note to the plaintiff and assigned the mortgage to
the defendant and thereafter the debtor-mortgagor made payment to
the mortgage holder in kind instead of to the plaintiff, the holder of
the note, it was held that money received by the mortgage holder
from the sale of the goods delivered to him, by mistake of the
mortgagor, was held on constructive trust for the benefit of the
holder of the note. 3
Quite often "mistake" appears to be another name for unprov-
able fraud when title is said to have been taken "by mistake" in the
name of a person other than the one paying the purchase price.
Thus, in Spence v. Foster Pottery Co.94 a trust was impressed on
property in favor of the wife when the husband and wife each
furnished one-half of the consideration but the deed was made out
to the husband only "by mistake" contrary to their intention. In
one case, an alleged "mistake" in a deed appears to have been in
fact a later change of mind; yet a constructive trust was declared.95
-- 184 N.C. 312, 114 S.E. 475 (1922).
"The court considered that the nephew's promise to abstain was good
consideration for the uncle's promise to convey and thus there was in effect
an agreement similar to that in Avery where the purchaser agreed to hold
the property until the other party paid the purchase price. In the instant
case the purchase price was the nephew's abstention from the use of alcohol
for 5 years.
"Walton Co. v. Davis, 114 N.C. 104, 19 S.E. 159 (1894).
"185 N.C. 218, 117 S.E. 32 (1923).
See, e.g., Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954).
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-D. Defenses to the Declaration of a Constructive Trust
1. Dissipation of the Res.--When the trust res under an express
trust has been dissipated and neither it nor its product can be identi-
fied or traced, an implied trust can not be impressed on any of the
trustee's assets." The same rule holds good when a constructive
trust is sought to be impressed upon property which has been trans-
ferred because of fraud, constructive fraud or mistake. Thus, in
Reynolds v. Whitin Mach. Works,97 the plaintiff sought to recover
the profits in specie from a competitor who used confidential infor-
mation, known only to the plaintiff and obtained from the plaintiff's
employee, in constructing and building an improved machine. It was
held that the proceeds of the sale of the machines were not so clearly
traceable to the original trust res-the technical information ob-
tained from the plaintiff's employee-as to justify the engrafting of
a trust. Similarly, in Carrow v. Weston" where defendant's testator
had given a worthless check to the plaintiff for logs which, along
with other logs belonging to the testator, were converted into lum-
ber, the court held that the logs were not traceable into any particular
fund held by the defendant administratrix and refused to impress a
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded seller on any of the
assets of the estate.
2. Legal Title to Res Not Held by Constructive Trustee.-Some
confusion had arisen in the past concerning the appropriateness of the
declaration of an implied trust because of a preoccupation with the
traditional distinction between void and voidable title.99 The pre-
occupation persists today. For example, in Carrow v. Weston, the
court said:
If no title passed to Weston (the purchaser of the logs who
gave a worthless check in payment), no title passed to the admin-
istratrix. She stands in the shoes of her intestate.... If we were
to assume that the logs came into her possession as the result of
Weston's wrongful conversion thereof, the question would then
" See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
07 167 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1948).
98247 N.C. 735, 102 S.E.2d 134 (1958).
" E.g., in Henderson v. Hoke, 21 N.C. 119, 150 (1835), Ruffin, C.J.,
stated: "If the plaintiff relies on his legal title then his relief is at law; but
if he establishes a trust, and attaches it to a particular estate, apparently
vested in the defendant under legal title it will be different. The subject then
is one of equitable jurisdiction . ... "
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arise as to whteher technically either Weston or the administra-
trix would be deemed a constructive trustee. Ordinarily a con-
structive trustee has legal title as well as possession.100
The court decided the case on other grounds as we have seen; how-
ever, the comment raises an old ghost which had slept long.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code one
who gave a worthless check for merchandise in a transaction in-
tended by the parties to be a cash sale got no title to the goods. His
status was that of a thief or converter. His title was void, not
voidable, and he could pass no property to a third person, even to a
bonafide purchaser, providing the aggrieved party was not estopped
from asserting his claim.Y01 In the early case of Campbell v.
Drake, °2 it was held that funds abstracted from a store by a clerk
could not be followed into the land which had been purchased with
the money on the ground that a thief could not be a trustee. The
effect of this decision was to preclude an owner from recovering the
product of the stolen goods in the hands of the thief, whereas he
might do so if the wrongdoer had gained possession by fraud or
mistake, an anomalous result. Campbell v. Drake was discussed at
length in Edwards v. Culberson,' and, although it was not express-
ly overruled, it was thoroughly discredited by the later opinion, and
the court has not since made the creation of a constructive trust
contingent upon the notion that legal title must pass to the wrong-
1o0 247 N.C. 735, 739, 102 S.E.2d 134, 138. (Emphasis added.)
101 Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 75 S.E.2d 312 (1953) and
cases there cited. In the Handley case the purchaser of an auto gave a
worthless check in payment. The court said:
It is a general, well-established principle that no one can transfer a
better title than he has. No person can by his sale . . . transfer to
another ownership in a thing in which has not the right of property,
except in the case of cash . . . [and bearer paper] transferable by
delivery in the ordinary course of business to a person taking the
same bona fide and paying value for it.... The purchaser of prop-
erty wrongfully taken by his vendor can no more perfect title to
property purchased than the vendor himself, and an innocent pur-
chaser for value can acquire no better title than the vendor had.
And the court awarded judgment against a bona fide purchaser from the
original fraudulent purchaser.
Under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-403 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-
403, a bona fide purchaser from a buyer who has given a worthless check
acquires good title to the goods. However, a thief, vi et armis, can pass no
title to a bona fide purchaser.
10238 N.C. 94 (1844).
111 N.C. 342, 344, 16 S.E. 233, 234 (1892).
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doer. "" For example, in the recent case of Wall v. Ruffin'
°5 the
defendants executed a deed thinking that it was a mortgage because
of misrepresentations of the grantee. This was fraud in the factum,
and the deed would have been void at common law and have con-
veyed no title. However, the court held that a bona fide purchaser
from the defrauding grantee might bring ejectment against the
duped grantors. The latter then might bring an action against the
person who had duped them to have a constructive trust impressed
upon the money he had received from the purchaser of the land.
The court quite properly ignored the old distinction between fraud
in the factum and fraud in the inducement of a deed, and looked
instead to the equities of the parties.1' 6 A constructive trust may be
impressed on property in the hands of another under circumstances
that would result in his unjust enrichment if he were to retain it.
1 7
3. Failure of Beneficiary of Constructive Trust to Comply with
the Recording Acts.-A failure to comply with the recording acts
is sometimes asserted as a defense to the enforcement of a construc-
tive trust. It has been repeatedly held, however, that neither con-
structive nor resulting trusts are subject to the requirements of the
recording acts because they are not in writing.' The beneficiary is
not required to give notice of his claim to the trust property, but if
the beneficiary of a trust by his words or conduct induces a third
person to believe that he has no interest in the property held by the
...The Court said: "(T)here is no good reason why the owner of
property taken and converted by one who has no right to its possession
should be less favorably situated in a court of equity, in respect of his
remedy . . . than one who by the abuse of trust has been injured by the
wrongful act of the trustee to whom possession the trust property has been
confined." Id. at 344, 16 S.E. at 234.
105261 N.C. 720, 136 S.E.2d 116 (1964).
108 See Briley v. Roberson, 214 N.C. 295, 199 S.E. 73 (1938). Cf. Troxler
v. New Era Bldg. Co., 137 N.C. 51, 49 S.E. 58 (1904).
1 0 
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160 (1937). But a converter, having no
title, never holds the converted chattel itself on a constructive trust; only the
proceeds are so held by him. See Comment, A Thief as Constructive Trustee,
37 YALE L.J. 654 (1928).
'0 See, e.g., Spence v. Foster Pottery Co., 185 N.C. 218, 220-21, 117
S.E. 32, 33 (1923) where the Court states:
(I)f these estates are to be preserved, it must be held that parol trusts,
and those enacted by operation of law such as are recognized in this
jurisdiction do not come within the meaning and purview of the
Connor Act. No doubt these trusts were purposely omitted from its
terms for the reason that, being incapable of registration because
not in writing, it was considered unfair and subversive of right to
destroy them in favor of one who had acquired his title with full
knowledge of their existence (or, the Court might have added, with-
out payment of value).
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trustee, and he knows or has reason to know that a third person is
extending or is likely to extend credit to the trustee in reliance upon
the trustee's apparent ownership, and a person does extend credit
in reliance thereon, the beneficiary is estopped from claiming a bene-
ficial interest against the general creditors of the trustee.10 Unless
the beneficiary is thus estopped, his unrecorded claim is superior to
that of a mortgagee who merely takes and records a mortgage but
gives up nothing in return and therefore is not a purchaser for
value." 0 Of course, a third party who extends additional credit or
incurs some detriment in consideration of the mortgage is a bona
fide purchaser and cuts off the equity of the trust beneficiary."'
E. Restitutionary Interests in Property Differentiated
from Security Interests
In determining whether compliance with recording statutes is
necessary to the perfecting of a claim against another's assets, the
distinction between a beneficiary under a constructive trust whose
claim is essentially restitutionary or proprietary, and that of a credi-
tor whose claim to the assets of the debtor is for security for the
underlying debt created by agreement of the parties becomes of
critical importance. When a creditor takes or retains legal title to
or is given a lien against property in the possession of the debtor as
security for the payment of the debt, the North Carolina General
Statutes require that all such reservations of interests by the creditor
be in writing and be recorded as required by law to be valid against
subsequent purchasers for value and lien creditors.:"' Neither an
unregistered mortgage, conditional sales contract or a mere oral lien
10' Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539, 200 S.E. 16 (1938). See also
Scon, TRUSTS § 313 (1956).
110 Southerland v. Fremont, 107 N.C. 565, 12 S.E. 237 (1890); Day v.
Day, 84 N.C. 408 (1881); Small v. Small, 79 N.C. 16 (1876).
" See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
.. Recordation is required by the General Statutes of North Carolina as
follows:
a. Deeds of trusts and mortgages of real and personal property by sec-
tion 47-20 (1950).
b. Conditional sales contracts by section 47-23 (1950).
c. Bailments for sale contracts by section 45-53 (1950).
d. Factors liens by sections 44-71 through 44-73 (1950).
e. Agricultural liens by section 44-52 (Supp. 1965).
f. Assignments of accounts receivable by section 44-78 (1950).
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can create an equity enforceable against subsequent purchasers for
value with notice of the prior unrecorded security interest." 3
A lien ordinarily arises out of a prior or contemporaneous con-
tractual relationship of the parties. An "equitable" lien, according
to the most common usage of the term, is the interest of a creditor
in the debtor's tangible property created by an "equitable" mortgage
-a term variously applied to the following transactions: (1) a
promise to give a legal mortgage on certain property in the future;
(2) an agreement, not executed so as to create a legal mortgage,
that certain property is presently to stand as security; and the con-
verse situations-(3) an absolute deed given on the grantee's prom-
ise to reconvey when a certain debt is paid. These three are
imperfect or formally defective security transactions arising from
a mutually intended debtor-creditor relationship." 4 Under North
Carolina law such equitable security interests in realty or personalty
are not enforceable against subsequent purchasers for value because
no notice of the equitable mortgage or lien, however full and formal,
will take the place of registration." 5
A pledgee's interest in the pledged property likewise is a security
interest rather than a proprietary one. In a New York case,'" a
debtor set aside certain securities he owned to secure his drawings
against Kessler and Company. These securities were in an envelope
in his safe marked, "Escrow account of Kessler and Co." When the
debtor went bankrupt several years later, Kessler and Company as-
serted a claim to these securities against the trustee in bankruptcy.
The United States Supreme Court said the right of the creditor,
". Eno Inv. Co. v. Protective Chems. Lab., 233 N.C. 294, 63 S.E.2d 637
(1951) (realty mortgage); M. & J. Fin. Corp. v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 580, 55
S.E. 836 (1934) (oral lien); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mayberry,
195 N.C. 508, 142 S.E. 767 (1928) (conditional sales contract).
... Apart from any requirement of the Statute of Frauds, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 22-1 to -4 (1965), a lien or mortgage not in writing, either legal or
equitable, arising out of a debtor-creditor relationship between the lienor
and the lienee is valid between the parties without registration. McCreary
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford, 253 N.C. 100, 116 S.E.2d 491 (1960);
Coggin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 9 F. Supp. 785 (M.D.N.C. 1935);
reversed, Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Coggin, 78 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.
1935); cert. denied, Coggin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 296 U.S. 620
(1935).
... New Home Bldg. Supply Co. v. Nations, 259 N.C. 681, 131 S.E.2d 425
(1963); Lawson v. Key, 199 N.C. 664, 155 S.E. 570 (1930); Duncan v.
Gulley, 119 N.C. 552, 155 S.E. 244 (1930)... Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U.S. 90 (1912).
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Kessler, to the securities depended upon whether the setting aside by
the bankrupt debtor was a sufficient delivery of collateral to the
creditor to perfect a pledge under the common law of New York.
Justice Holmes described this informal "security transaction" as
giving rise to an "equitable lien" in favor of Kessler which was
enforceable against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.'1
7
F. Equitable "Restitutionary" Liens
The voluntary segregating of collateral by the debtor in Kessler
and the resulting "equitable lien" in favor of Kessler and Company
exemplifies the more common usage of "lien" among lawyers and
businessmen as descriptive of the interest a creditor may have in
specific assets of his debtor. But the term "equitable lien" is also
used to describe an interest of an aggrieved party in property which
a wrongdoer is unjustly withholding from him. Underlying the
former connotation of lien is an agreement that the debtor-creditor
relationship will exist, whereas there is no such agreement under-
lying the latter use of the term. When the term "equitable lien" is
used in this latter sense, it is analogous to a constructive trust in
that both arise contrary to the intention of the burdened party and
are basically unlike the voluntary giving of security or attempt to
do so as in Kessler, and there is no agreement that the debtor-
creditor relationship shall exist.
For example, section 202 of the Restatement of the Law of
.1 At common law the rules making a transfer effective as a pledge were:
(1) the property pledged had to be delivered to the pledgee; (2) if the
pledged property was returned to the pledgor, it could not be mixed with
other property of the pledgor; (3) if the pledged property consisted of notes,
accounts or other evidence of indebtedness, and the pledgee returned such
notes or accounts to the hands of the pledgor for collection, the funds arising
from the collection of the pledged property had to be kept separate and
distinct and intact. Bundy v. Commercial Credit Corp., 202 N.C. 604, 609,
163 S.E. 676 (1932); Milling Co. v. Stevenson, 161 N.C. 510, 77 S.E. 676
(1913); Bizzell v. Roberts, 156 N.C. 272, 72 S.E. 378 (1911); Rose v.
Coble; 61 N.C. 517 (1868). A pledge or assignment of accounts receivable
must now be recorded pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-78 (1950, Supp.
1965) to be good as against creditors or subsequent purchasers for value of
the pledgor or assignor. But when the indebtedness due the pledgor is evi-
denced by notes as in Sexton, a pledge of these notes if perfected by delivery
to the pledgee followed by delivery back to the pledgor for collection with
segregation of the proceeds in an account separate and distinct from the
pledgor's other funds would be good against creditors and subsequent pur-
chasers for value without recording. Bundy v. Commercial Credit, 202 N.C.
604, 163 S.E. 676 (1932).
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Restitution permits the beneficiary of a constructive trust to enforce
an "equitable lien" upon the property "as security for his claim
against the trustee, holding the trustee personally liable for the bal-
ance of his claim" where the property wrongfully acquired by the
trustee is or becomes less valuable than the trust property used in
acquiring it."18 For example, suppose T is trustee for B under an
express trust of 10,000 dollars. In breach of trust, T purchases
Blackacre with the money, taking title in his own name. B can re-
quire T to convey Blackacre to him if Blackacre is worth more than
10,000 dollars at the time the breach is discovered. On the other
hand if Blackacre is worth only 5,000 dollars, B may enforce an
"equitable lien" against Blackacre by demanding a judicial sale and
receiving the proceeds therefrom, and may hold T personally liable
for the balance of the 10,000 dollar claim. The "equitable lien"
defined by section 202 does not arise out of any consensual, debtor-
creditor relationship like the "equitable lien" in Kessler, nor does it
arise in the usual course of business transactions on credit. Like the
constructive trust, the section 202 lien is restitutionary, arising by
implication of law to prevent the unjust enrichment of one of the
parties, and usually is contrary to the intention of one or both
parties. Like the constructive trust, its enforceability does not de-
pend upon recordation.
Another circumstance calling for the declaration of an equitable
lien to prevent unjust enrichment is the case in which the wrongdoer
has not acquired title to all or part of the product of the assets of
the aggrieved party. In cases where the wrongdoer has used the
plaintiff's property to make improvements to realty or chattels to
which the wrongdoer already had title, the aggrieved party is said
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 202 (1935) reads as follows:
(1) Where the trustee by the wrongful disposition of trust prop-
erty acquires other property which is or becomes more valuable than
the trust property used in acquiring it, the beneficiary is entitled to
reach the property so acquired and thus to secure the profit which
arises with the transaction. (2) Where, on the other hand, the prop-
erty acquired is or becomes less valuable than the trust property used
in acquiring it, the beneficiary can hold the trustee personally liable
for the value of the property so used, and can enforce an equitable
lien upon the property so acquired as security for his claim against the
trustee, holding the trustee personally liable for the balance of his
claim. (3) Since the transaction is in breach of trust, the trustee is
accountable for profits and chargeable with losses arising therefrom.
(Numerals and emphasis added.)
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to have an "equitable lien" on the property and is not considered to
be the beneficiary of a constructive trust.119
In Fulp v. Fulp,20 for example, the plaintiff wife had contri-
buted one-half of the construction costs of additions to a dwelling
house from her personal funds with the understanding that her hus-
band would convey to her an undivided one-half interest in the
property. When the work was completed in 1952, the husband re-
fused to convey. Husband and wife separated in May 1959 and the
wife brought suit against her husband in December 1959 to have a
resulting or constructive trust declared, or in the alternative to re-
cover the money allegedly invested in the property.
The court held that when the husband refused to convey he be-
came liable to the wife for all the money he had received from her
under the oral contract because such an obligation was enforceable
in an action in assumpsit for money he had received. 2 1 Further-
more the court said: "Because they were not strangers, plaintiff
was entitled not only to a judgment for the money advanced but also
to the remedy of an equitable lien."'
22
The court cited Etheridge v. Cochran23 and Bowling v. Bowl-
ing' 24 in support of this statement, cases in which the court had
declared a constructive trust rather than an equitable lien. The
court also stated:
"' RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 170 (1937), "Where a person makes
improvements upon property of another or otherwise increases its value,
being induced by fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake of such a char-
acter that he is entitled to restitution, he is entitled to an equitable lien
upon the property." Comment (a) makes this rule applicable where a person
pays for services or supplies materials.
10 264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965).
121 Id. at 23, 140 S.E.2d at 712.
... Id. at 23, 140 S.E.2d at 712. (Emphasis added.) The implication of
the court's statement is that plaintiff would have no lien apart from the
confidential nature of the relationship between the husband and wife. Com-
pare RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 161 (1937). "Where property of one
person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for
a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched,
an equitable lien arises."
123 196 N.C. 681, 146 S.E. 711 (1929). When a wife receives checks
from her parents as a personal gift and she indorses them to her husband,
there is a presumption that he receives the money in trust for her in the
absence of evidence that it was intended as a gift.
24252 N.C. 527, 114 S.E.2d 228 (1960). Where land held by the
entireties is sold and the purchase price is by checks made payable to both
husband and wife, and the wife endorses the checks and turns them over
to her husband who invests the proceeds in other property, he holds the
property in trust where there is no evidence that the land held by the
entireties was purchased with his own funds.
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Since she is able to trace the money into the improvements which
the defendant made on the land any judgment obtainable would
qualify as an equitable lien. Trust Co. v. Barrett, 238 N.C. 579,
78 S.E.2d 730; Edwards v. Culberson, 111, N.C. 342, 16 S.E.
233.125
Again in each of the cases cited the court had declared a constructive
trust. The court in Fulp recognized that the purpose of the "equi-
table lien" in that case and the "constructive trust" declared in the
cases it cited in support of plaintiff's equitable right in defendant's
property was the same: to give the plaintiff an enforceable claim
against specific property into which plaintiff could trace her funds.
In a previous case it had expressly equated the owner of property
improved with another's funds with a constructive trustee. 2 6 One
important difference between the two analogous interests of the de-
frauded party is the method of enforcement. A constructive trust
on realty normally is enforced by a judgment transferring the trust
property to the beneficiary. 7 An equitable lien on realty of the kind
declared in Pulp is enforced-if the court thinks such action best
satisfies the equities of all concerned-by a judicial sale of the
property and apportionment to the lienholder of the proceeds of the
sale according to the amount of his interest in the property sold. 2 8
But in origin and in purpose the constructive trust and "restitution-
ary" equitable lien are twin remedies.
The use of the term "equitable lien" to describe both (1) an
imperfect or formally defective security transaction such as an equi-
table mortgage or an undelivered pledge of personalty as in Sexton
v. Kessler,2 ' and (2) the proprietary interest of a person entitled to
relief of the kind described in section 202 of the Restatement of the
Law of Restitution or to an equitable lien when one's funds are
wrongfully used to improve property belonging to another is con-
fusing to say the least. 12 a The intent of the parties to create a debtor-
125 264 N.C. at 24, 140 S.E.2d at 712.
.2 Michael v. Moore, 157 N.C. 462, 468-69, 73 S.E. 104, 106-07 (1911).
.2. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 160, comments e, / (1937).
12' RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 161, comment b. (1937). Another dif-
ference between a restitutionary lien and a constructive trust was pointed
out by the Court in a quotation from POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPUDENCE
§§ 165, 166, 1234 n.5 (5th ed. 1941) to the effect that an equitable lien does
not entitle the holder to use or profits of the property charged and hence
was not a trust strictly speaking. But see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
§ 202(3) (1937) quoted supra note 118.
129225 U.S. 90 (1912).
129a A restitutionary equitable lien also arises: (1)Where the conversion.
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creditor relationship or to give or withhold security for a debt is
always a determining factor in establishing an "equitable lien" of
the first category 130 and such equitable liens must be recorded.
Therefore they must be distinguished from the constructive trust
and the "equitable lien" of the second category which are imposed by
law without regard to intent, in order to prevent unjust enrichment.
This second category is not subject to recording statutes. One author
has suggested that "imposed lien" or "restitutionary lien" would be
more suggestive for the latter type with which this paper is exclu-
sively concerned. 13 1  Since usage of "equitable lien" is inveterate,
the lawyer can only be on guard each time the term is used to ascer-
tain whether "equitable lien" means a creditor's security or a restitu-
tionary remedy analogous to a constructive trust.
G. Claims of Creditors of a Holder of Property Subject to
a Constructive Trust or Restitutionary Equitable Lien
More often than not the holder of the trust property in cases of
constructive trust is a man hard pressed for funds, if not actually in-
solvent. The wrongful or erroneous transfer of the property to the
present holder which the plaintiff seeks to undo often has been moti-
vated by the insistent demands of the wrongdoer's bill collectors and
money lenders. Hence, once the property has been transferred to
the wrongdoer, either by fraud or mistake, the question of whether
the transferor or the creditors of the wrongdoer shall have priority
to the property often arises.
1. General Creditors of Wrongdoer.-If some of the general
creditors of an insolvent debtor have brought a general creditor's
action, it is well settled that they acquire no priority over other
general creditors thereby, nor will the action interfere with existing
security or restitutionary liens.132 Furthermore, an assignee for the
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 203 (1937). (2) Where proceeds from the
sale of property converted are held by a third party who was a donee of the
property without notice of the wrong. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 204
(1937).
... Ferguson v. Blanchard, 220 N.C. 1, 16 S.E.2d 414 (1939); O'Briant
v. Lee, 214 N.C. 723, 200 S.E. 865 (1939). See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 24,
69, 85 (1951).
" Lacy, Constructive Trusts and Equitable Liens in Iowa, 40 IOWA L.
REv. 107, 119 (1954).
... Taylor v. Lauer, 127 N.C. 157, 37 S.E. 197 (1900); Hancock Bros.
v. Wooten, 107 N.C. 9, 12 S.E. 199 (1890); Bronson v. Wilmington Life.
Ins. Co., 85 N.C. 411 (1881).
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benefit of creditors who is appointed a few days after the assignor-
debtor misrepresents his solvency to a seller of goods and has ob-
tained the goods because of the seller's reliance on the debtor's
misrepresentations is not protected against the claims of the de-
frauded seller.'33 The latter is not a "security lien" holder but is a
beneficiary of a constructive trust, and has a preferred claim to the
goods or their product, if identifiable, in the hands of the insolvent
buyer's assignee or trustee for the benefit of general creditors.
2. Judgment Creditors of Wrongdoer.-The same preference
for the beneficiary of a constructive trust or restitutionary lien fol-
lows if one of the general creditors reduces his claim to judgment
and attempts to execute it by levying against property which is
subject to such trust or lien. In Jackson v. Thompson3 the defen-
dant had purchased land with his wife's money but had not recorded
her title. Hence, he held the lands either on a resulting trust or
subject to a constructive trust being declared. The plaintiff sought
to levy on this land by way of execution of a money judgment
against the defendant, alleging that he had loaned money to the
defendant, the apparent owner of the land, on the strength of his
holdings. The court said:
There was no recorded deed to the judgment debtor which
might have gone into the estimate of the defendant's solvency;
and even if there had been, the relation of a mere judgment
creditor toward the property of his debtor is not of such a char-
acter as to effect or defeat the rights of the cestais qui trustent.
The reason for this rule is stated in Guaranty State Bank v.
Pratt ... : 'A judgment creditor is in a very different position
from one who has bought and paid, or who has loaned money on
the face of a recorded title, and he is not a bona fide purchaser,
for the reason that he has parted with nothing to acquire his
lien ... and for that reason equity does not regard the judgment
creditor, but assists those who have invested in, and therefore
have a substantial interest in, the real estate."13 5
3. Trustees in Bankruptcy of Wrongdoer.-A trustee in bank-
"'Wallace, Elliot & Co. v. Cohen, 111 N.C. 103, 15 S.E. 892 (1892).
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-702, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-702,
which gives the seller a right to reclaim goods from a buyer who has made
a fraudulent misrepresentation as to his solvency if the seller demands the
goods within ten days after receipt.
"'214 N.C. 539, 200 S.E. 16 (1938).
"'Id. at 543, 200 S.E. at 18. (Emphasis added.) Accord, Kelly Spring-
field Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925).
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ruptcy stands in the shoes of the debtor13' and also has the status of
a judgment creditor with a lien on behalf of all of the unsecured
creditors of the bankrupt dating from the date the petition is filed.1
3 7
As the debtor's alter ego the trustee takes title to his assets subject
to all equities and defenses existing against the bankrupt at the time
of the filing of the petition and comes into no less, but no better,
right or title than the bankrupt had.1 3' This rule is clearly inferable
from the fact that under section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, the
trustee takes "only title of the bankrupt" and comes into that title
only "by operation of law."'119 Therefore, he is not a bona fide
purchaser but a successor in title. However, the trustee in bank-
ruptcy is more than a mere successor in title; he is also a representa-
tive of the court and acts on behalf of the general creditors. 4
Section 70 (c) of the Act provides:
The trustee, as to all property whether or not coming into posses-
sion or control of the court upon which a creditor of the bankrupt
could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at
the date of the bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such
date with all the rights, remedies and powers of a creditor then
holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a
creditor exists.'
4'
The bankruptcy court looks to the law of the state to determine
whether the trustee in bankruptcy in his status as a judgment lien
holder on behalf of the general creditors takes precedence over one
claiming as a beneficiary of a resulting trust or as a possible bene-
ficiary of a constructive trust or restitutionary lien. For the trustee
in bankruptcy takes title subject to "all defenses and equities exist-
ing against the bankrupt"-he is privy to his bankrupt's fraud and
is bound by its consequences.' 42 Hence, a contract which is subject
235 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964), provides in pertinent
part as follows: "(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his succes-
sor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification
shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as
of the date of the filing of the petition. .. ."
. Chattanooga Nat'l Bank v. Rome Iron Co., 102 Fed. 755 (N.D. Ga.
1900); 3 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 324-28 (Henderson ed. 1957) (here-
inafter cited as REMINGTON).
18 Higgs v. Renfro, 195 Okla. 545, 159 P.2d 749 (1945).
1°830 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964).
.. Chattanooga Nat'l Bank v. Rome Iron Co., 102 Fed. 755, 759-60 (N.D.
Ga. 1900).
14 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
... It re Kimbrough-Veasey Co., 292 Fed. 757 (N.D. Ga. 1923).
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to reformation against the bankrupt under state law is subject
to reformation against the trustee.1 43 And, if a defrauded seller's
rights are superior to those of a judgment creditor or an assignee
for the benefit of creditors under state law, as in fact they are under
the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court,' then the
seller may reclaim the goods from the trustee in bankruptcy.'45
One authority states:
Where the bankrupt holds property in trust for the benefit
of another, equitable title is in such other notwithstanding legal
title is in the trustee, and it is very doubtful whether any title
whatever vests in the bankruptcy trustee, as the bankruptcy court
is a court of equity dealing primarily in the equities of the situa-
tion. It is not within the scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction to ad-
minister an express trust, but such court will recognize and give
force and effect to resulting and constructive trusts in property
held by the bankrupt and even to obligations in the notice of a
trust.... Whatever obligations of this kind attach to property
coming into the bands of the bankruptcy trustee are good as
against him and must be observed.' 46
However, if the bankrupt holds property as a constructive trustee,
the beneficiary may not retake his property with the connivance of
the bankrupt constructive trustee 4 7 or by claim and delivery be-
cause, from the date of the filing of the petition, the bankrupt is con-
sidered to go out of possession of his assets although the trustee in
bankruptcy has not yet been appointed. 4 ' Likewise, neither may a
beneficiary under an implied trust nor a creditor of the bankrupt at-
tach or garnish a bankrupt's property.149 After the trustee in bank-
ruptcy is appointed, the bankrupt holds possession for the trustee in
bankruptcy in a manner similar to the possession of a servant for his
master.'50 The claims of persons claiming as beneficiaries of implied
trusts or restitutionary liens impressed on property in the hands of
the bankrupt, being in the nature of adverse claims, may require a
... Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 134 (1910).
'"See note 133 supra and accompanying text.
'"In re Gold, 210 Fed. 410 (7th Cir. 1913).
483 RE I NGT N 346. The author quotes In re Milne, 185 Fed. 244 (2d
Cir. 1910) in support of his statement.
1,7 Operators' Piano Co. v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 283 Fed. 904
(7th Cir. 1922).
" 8 Kinmouth v. Braeutigam, 63 N.J. Eq. 103, 52 Atl. 226 (1902).
""Acme Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.S. 300 (1911).... Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562 (1909).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
plenary suit against the trustee in bankruptcy to establish the as-
serted rights.'
Even though the trustee in bankruptcy holds title and possession
of the bankrupt's assets subject, generally, to the equities of those
claiming as beneficiaries of constructive trusts or restitutionary liens
on the assets, might not the trustee in bankruptcy defeat the con-
structive trusts by resorting to section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act ?152
Section 60 declares that the recognition of "equitable liens" where
available means of perfecting legal liens shall not have been employed
is contrary to the policy of the act that forbids the granting of a
preference to a general creditor by giving him a security interest in
the debtor's property after the latter has become or is about to be-
come insolvent. However, this provision is operable only "If a
transfer is for security,5 3 and it has been construed as not applicable
to restitutionary liens such as that provided for in section 202 of
the Restatement of the Law of Restitution or to constructive trusts
because neither of these two remedies arise out of a security trans-
action. 5 '
It follows that if a transaction of the kind calling for the decla-
ration of a constructive trust or restitutionary lien is the basis of a
claim against a bankrupt, such claim takes preference over the claims
of general creditors in so far as the trust res is concerned. In other
words, if the claim on a specific asset arises out of accident, mistake,
or fraud or constructive fraud of the bankrupt, the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act does not forbid the giving of a preference to the claimant.
However, the fact that a constructive trust or restitutionary lien is
not a forbidden preference under the Bankruptcy Act does not mean
that the bankruptcy court will invariably grant this type of relief.
It will temper the remedy so as to do substantial equity with due
regard for rights of all the claimants to the bankrupt's assets. 155
... See 5 REMINGTON § 2134.
1r264 Stat. 22 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1964).
64 Stat. 22 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 6(a) (6) (1964).
... Danais v. M. De Matteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874 (D.N.H. 1952)
(equitable lien on money due from sub-contractors in favor of surety who
made good on contractor's default "not the equitable lien spoken of in the
statute.") See Lacy, Constructive Trusts and Equitable Liens in Iowa, 40
IOWA L. Rav. 107, 129, (1954).
... Speight v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 209 N.C. 563, 183 S.E. 734
(1936); Edwards v. Culberson, 111 N.C. 342, 16 S.E. 233 (1892).
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H. Statute of Limitations
Considerable doubt has arisen from time to time concerning the
applicable statute of limitations in cases giving rise to a constructive
trust under North Carolina law. There are many obiter dicta to the
effect that a resulting or constructive trust; i.e., an implied trust, as
distinguished from an express trust, is governed by the ten-year
56
and not the three-year 57 statute of limitations.' An example of
such dicta is Teachey v. Gurley'59 in which the court actually decided
that an express, oral trust had been undertaken by the defendant,
and consequently that the cause of action for breach of trust did
not exist and the statute of limitations did not start to run until the
defendant-trustee had repudiated the express trust to the knowledge
of the beneficiary. Nevertheless, the court stated the following
dictum relating to trusts implied by law.
Actions to enforce constructive or resulting trusts are based
on the original wrongful or tortious act of the person holding
title by reason of which equity impresses a trust upon his title.
No contract relation exists. A cause of action arises when the
wrong is committed. Therefore the statute of limitations imme-
diately begins to run, and the ten-year statute applies unless soon-
er barred under the doctrine of laches.'0 0
On one occasion sixty years ago the court actually applied the ten-
year statute in an action giving rise to the declaration of an implied
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-56 (1953).
.. N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-52 (1953).... E.g., Norton v. McDevit, 122 N.C. 755, 30 S.E. 24 (1898) where
the court's reference to the ten-year statute was dictum because the bene-
ficiary of the implied trust was in possession, and a statute of limitations
does not run against the beneficiary of trust who is in possession of
property as his own. See Mask v. Tiller, 89 N.C. 423 (1883). Similar
references in Bowen v. Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954); Wolfe
v. Smith, 215 N.C. 286, 1 S.E.2d 815 (1939); and Wise v. Raynor, 200 N.C.
567, 157 S.E. 853 (1931) also are dicta because the beneficiary was in posses-
sion. Other references to the ten-year statute of limitations may be found
in Jarrett v. Green, 230 N.C. 104, 52 S.E.2d 223 (1949) ; Creech v. Creech,
222 N.C. 656, 24 S.E.2d 642 (1943) ; and Teachey v. Gurley, 214 N.C. 288,
199 S.E. 83 (1938). But in the three latter cases the beneficiary had in
fact brought the action within three years from the date of notice that the
defendant had breached his trust, and so the plaintiff's action was timely
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52 (1953) which permits the bringing of an
action within three years of the discovery of the fraud or mistake by the
plaintiff.
159 214 N.C. 288, 199 S.E. 83 (1938).
160 Id. at 293-94, 199 S.E. at 87-88. (Emphasis added.)
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trust. In Norcum v. Savage 61 an action was allowed to be brought
more than five years after the statute of limitations had begun to
run against the plaintiffs.' 62 But more recently, the supreme court
had looked to the nature of the cause of action. If the action had
arisen out of a breach of trust by a fiduciary or by one in whom the
aggrieved party had justifiably reposed special confidence which re-
sulted in the former's superiority or influence on the other, the
period of limitations, as in cases of fraud, would start on the day
that the breach of fiduciary duty is discovered, or with reasonable
diligence would have been discovered, 16 3 and would run for three
years; i.e., the period of limitation for the tort of deceit and for
breach of simple contract.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a recent decision
so interpreted the North Carolina law. In New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Waller" a judgment creditor sought to impress a construc-
tive trust on the product of funds in possession of the debtor's wife
which the debtor had transferred to her four years before in fraud
of the plaintiff. After finding that the plaintiff was chargeable with
101 140 N.C. 472, 53 S.E. 289 (1906).
" The facts in Norcumn merit summarizing. The plaintiffs' mother had
paid for the property and had taken the original deed in her name, which
deed had been lost or stolen. The plaintiffs' father, wrongfully or mis-
takenly then had taken title in his own name to the property by a second
deed from the original grantor's heirs. The court held that the plaintiffs'
father thereafter held the land as trustee for the plaintiffs' mother, subject to
his life estate by the curtesy. The father's misconduct or mistake in taking
title in himself occurred prior to 1869, but the plaintiffs were under a dis-
ability to sue by reason of their minority, and later by reason of coverture
until the Act of 13 February 1899 removed this latter disability. By that
date their father had died, and the land had passed, apparently by devise, to
the half sisters of the plaintiffs. There is no question that on February 13,
1899 the plaintiffs knew of their father's wrongdoing and had the capacity
to bring an action against their half sisters to recover the property. But they
waited five years before commencing the action. On these facts the court
said at 140 N.C. 472, 474, 53 S.E. 289-90: "The action so far as it seeks to
have a trust declared and a conveyance made by the defendants would be
barred only by the ...lapse of ten years . . . which time began to run
against the plaintiffs . . .on 13 February 1899."
"3 Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 63 S.E.2d 202 (1951). But mere registra-
tion of a deed adverse to plaintiff's interests is not notice of defendant's
wrongdoing. In Little v. Bank of Wadesboro, 187 N.C. 1, 121 S.E. 185
(1924), plaintiff sought to have a deed set aside which he himself had made
seven years before because of undue influence of his father. His father had
died only a year before the action was brought. The plaintiff had judgment,
but on appeal a new trial was ordered to ascertain whether the father's undue
influence had ceased more than three years before the commencement of
the action and, if so, the plaintiff's action was barred., 301 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1962).
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notice of the fraudulent transfer, Judge Haynsworth, speaking for
the court, said:
In a number of North Carolina cases there may be found
expressions, such as 'a resulting or constructive trust, as distin-
guished from an express trust, is governed by the ten-year statute
of limitations' (citing Bowen v. Darden, Teachey v. Gurley, and
Jarrett v. Green). 1 5 Such references in a single breath to con-
structive trusts and resulting trusts are found in opinions dealing
with resulting trusts. It is clear the action to enforce a result-
ing trust is governed by the 10-year statute .... 166
Then the court held that the nature of the wrongful act, not the
remedy which the plaintiff was seeking determined the statute of
limitations. In Little v. Bank of Wadesborol6" it had been decided
that undue influence was tantamount to fraud, and that the three-year
statute of limitations applied in an action to set aside a deed. There-
1. See cases cited note 155 supra.
106 301 F.2d at 844. The distinction between resulting trusts and con-
structive trusts is more easily stated than applied in some situations. A
purchase money resulting trust arises when one person pays the considera-
tion for the transfer of the property but the title is taken in the name of
another. See Edwards & Van Hecke, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in
North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. lZv. 177 (1939). A given set of facts may rise
to either a resulting or constructive trust or both. For example, Husband
has access to Wife's funds. He purchases Blackacre with them, taking title
in the name of T Corporation which he owns and controls. Under the law
of North Carolina the T Corporation would hold Blackacre upon a result-
ing trust in favor of the wife proportionate to her involuntary contribution
to the purchase price. (See Norton v. McDevit, 122 N.C. 755, 30 S.E. 24
(1898) where a resulting trust was found upon the idea of "mistake or bad
faith" in not taking the deed to the party paying for the property.) But
obviously neither Husband nor Wife actually intended that T Corporation
should hold the land as trustee, and such an intention can no more be
implied or inferred from the circumstances than it can be inferred from the
fact that there was no expression whatsoever of such intention. If T Cor-
poration holds the land as trustee, it must do so simply because that is the
jural relationship which courts have declared shall result from the facts
like those stated. Therefore, it would appear that T Corporation holds title
to Blackacre "independent of any actual or presumed intent of the parties,"
and that the facts give rise to a constructive trust instead of, or in addition
to, a resulting trust. This relatively simple hypothetical situation illustrates
an ambiguity in the definitions of resulting and constructive trusts under
North Carolina law so clearly apparent that prudent counsel today pray for
the declaration of either a constructive trust or a resulting trust or both in
an action in which they think an implied trust should be declared. Bowen v.
Darden, 241 N.C. 11, 84 S.E.2d 289 (1954); Jarrett v. Green, 230 N.C. 104,
107, 52 S.E.2d 223 (1949) (Counsel for plaintiff requested a resulting or
constructive trust). In Creech v. Creech, 222 N.C. 656, 24 S.E.2d 642
(1943), plaintiff requested a parol or resulting trust.
1 '187 N.C. 1, 121 S.E. 185 (1924).
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fore, the same three-year statute was held to apply in an action to
declare a constructive trust where the wrongful act was fraud of
creditors. Thus, inasmuch as fraud, constructive fraud, and mistake
are the grounds for impressing a constructive trust on property
which has wrongfully been transferred, it would appear that the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, when applying North
Carolina law, would not impress a constructive trust if more than
three years have elapsed since the aggrieved party has received actual
notice of the fraud or mistake.
However, the North Carolina Supreme Court in Fulp v. FulpH68
apparently has rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of North
Carolina law. It will be remembered that, in accordance with the
prevailing view, the court in Fulp decided that the defendant held
title to the disputed property subject to a restitutionary lien in favor
of the plaintiff because the defendant had breached his promise to
convey an undivided one-half interest in the property to the plaintiff
after she had paid one-half of the construction costs of an improve-
ment to the dwelling out of her personal funds.'69 The court also
held that the three-year limitation perior for simple contract actions
applied in this case because the action arose out of a breach of con-
tract.170 Up to this point the North Carolina court seemed to be of
the same opinion as the Fourth Circuit; that is to say, the nature of
the wrongful act and not the remedy sought determines the statute
of limitations. However, the court went on to say:
Were the plaintiff the certui qui trust of . . . a constructive
trust, the ten-year statute would apply, G.S. 1-56 . . . and, she
sharing the defendant's possession, the statute would not have
begun to run against her until the separation of the parties on
May 31, 1959, some seven years after the breach of promise by
the husband to convey title to the wife in consideration of her
contribution to the cost of the alterations. The ten-year statute
applies when the title to property is at issue, not where, as here,
the action is merely for breach of contract .... 171
The court's reference to the ten-year statute adds yet another to a
long list of similar dicta.' 2
""264 N.C. 20, 140 S.E.2d 708 (1965).
10 See note 122 supra.
170 264 N.C. 26; 140 S.E.2d 714.
171 Id. at 26, 140 S.E.2d at 714. (Emphasis added.)
"" See note 158 supra.
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Having decided that the three-year statute of limitations appli-
cable to Mrs. Fulp's action against her husband, the court observed
that plaintiff was aware of her husband's breach of contract more
than three years prior to the commencement of the action and there-
fore her action was barred. Thus, the case stands as precedent for
two rules:
(1) Where a restitutionary lien is the appropriate remedy for
a legal wrong, the applicable statute of limitations will be determined
by the nature of the wrongful act.
(2) Where the holder of a restitutionary lien is in possession
of the property subject to the lien, the period of limitations will
run against him-as it did against Mrs. Fulp-from the date the
cause of action accrues.
The dicta in Fulp are as follows:
(1) Where a constructive trust is the appropriate remedy, the
ten-year statute of limitations may be applied.
1 7 3
(2) Where the beneficiary of a constructive trust is in posses-
sion of the trust property the statute of limitations will not begin
to run until he goes out of possessionY 4
From the rules of decision and the dicta, the following conclu-
sion appears warranted:
The determination of the statute of limitations appropriate to
an action brought for the purpose of obtaining a restitutionary,
equitable remedy will depend upon which of the two such remedies-
equitable lien or constructive trust-is appropriate.
If this conclusion is correct, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly inter-
preted North Carolina law in the New Amsterdam Cas 5 case in
which it was said that the nature of the underlying wrongful act, not
the remedy sought, determines what is the appropriate statute of
limitations.
Pulp was a classical "equity" case in that it involved an oral con-
tract to convey realty from husband to wife. The wife waited for
seven years after knowing of her husband's breach before she in-
.. Accord, Norcum v. Savage, 140 N.C. 472, 53 S.E. 287 (1906); but see
Vail v. Vail, 233 N.C. 109, 63 S.E.2d 202 (1851) and Little v. Bank of
Wadesboro, 187 N.C. 1, 121 S.E. 185 (1924).
.. Accord, Bowen v. Barden, 241 N.C. 11, 17, 84 S.E.2d 289, 294 (1954)
and cases cited therein.1- 187 N.C. 1, 121 S.E. 185 (1924).
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yoked the aid of equity.' But during these seven years their mar-
riage was a happy one for aught else that appears. Can it be said
that the wife was chargeable with laches because she failed to bring
an action against her husband while she was sharing his house, bed,
and board? She was so charged. Equity followed the law, and
refused to pass on the merits of plaintiff's claim.
The court, in justice and equity and in recognition of the simi-
larity of the equitable restitutionary remedies, the constructive trust
and equitable lien, might well have declared that where the hold-
er of an equitable lien, restitutionary in purpose, is in possession
or shares in the possession of the property, the court will apply the
same rule concerning the running of the statute of limitations as it
does when the beneficiary of a constructive trust is in possession of
the trust property. In neither case should the statute begin to run
until the holder or beneficiary goes out of possession.
With respect to the dictum that the ten-year statute may apply
when the remedy sought is a constructive trust, only cautious accep-
tance is justified. Until the court actually allows an action to be
brought from four to ten years after the wrongdoing has been dis-
covered by a plaintiff out of possession and thereby demonstrates
that Norcum v. Savage is still good law, 7' prudent counsel should
assume that the period of limitation in cases where an equitable
restitutionary remedy is sought is the period prescribed for the
wrongful act, be it a breach of contract or a tort, in spite of the
dictum in Fulp v. Fulp.
I. CONCLUSION
The Pulp opinion gives new life to the idea that a constructive
trust in some kind of mystical "estate" analogous to the beneficial
interest in express trust property, but created by law upon the
happening of certain wrongful acts, and which, if not perfected by
adjudication within ten years from the date of its creation, inex-
plicably ceases to exist. An equitable restitutionary lien, on the other
hand, seems to be merely a remedy that, in the opinion of the su-
preme court, is available only as long as the underlying cause of
action may be brought. When both are viewed merely as equitable
'o See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
'" See notes 161-62 supra and accompanying text.
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remedies like specific performance, reformation, or injunction, the
aura of mystery surrounding constructive trusts and restitutionary
equitable liens disappears. These latter two remedies ought to con-
tinue to play an effective and understandable role in North Carolina
jurisprudence as they have since they "emerged from the fog of
equity." The remedial nature of the constructive trust was empha-
sized in New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller:
A constructive trust is merely a procedural device by which
a court of equity may rectify certain wrongs. It is suggestive of
a power which a court of equity may exercise in an appropriate
case, but it is not a designation of the cause of action which justi-
fies the exercise of that power 1 8
The ruling case law of North Carolina, viewed as a whole and
discounting many contrary dicta, such as that in Fulp v. Fulp, sup-
ports Judge Haynsworth's notion that whatever the cause of action
may be-fraud, mistake, undue influence, conversion, or breach of a
trust or other fiduciary agreement-in an appropriate case, a con-
structive trust may be impressed to remedy a substantive wrong. In
the words of Judge Cardozo:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the con-
science of equity finds expression. When property has been ac-
quired in such circumstances that the holder of legal title may not
in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts
him into a trustee.179
Or as stated in the Restatement of the Law of Restitution:
Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equi-
table duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would
be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a construc-
tive trust arises. 80
As we have seen, the essence of the remedy of the constructive
trust and the restitutionary lien is the tracing of the res or its product
and its recovery in specie by the so-called beneficiary of the con-
structive trust or lien. Thus one who succeeds in persuading a court
to declare a constructive trust or restitutionary lien has thereby
... 301 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added.)
. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E.
378, 380 (1919) as quoted in New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 196 F.
Supp. 780, 791 (M.D.N.C. 1961).... RESTATEMENT, RFESTITUTION § 160 (1937).
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converted his claim against the wrongdoer into a proprietary claim
against specific assets and, in effect, has persuaded the court to give
him a preference over others whose claims are not secured by specific
assets of the wrongdoer. A court will temper this remedy so as to
do substantial equity in accordance with all of the facts and with all
of the conflicting claims in mind,' 81 remembering that "equity assists
those who have invested in and therefor have substantial interest" in
the property as distinguished from those who have not invested but
have only an imperfect security interest in it.
18 2
"A court of equity (such as a superior court of North Carolina)
adopts its relief to the exigencies of the case at hand."'8 3 Estoppel
and laches may be called upon to avoid doctrinaire adherence to rules
which would do violence to justice in the particular case. In investi-
gating allegations of unjust enrichment, courts of equity ought to
disregard mere technicalities and artificial rules and look only at the
general characteristics of the case, going at once to essential morality
and merit. 8 ' The constructive trust and restitutionary lien are equi-
table remedies like injunction or specific performance which the
court in the exercise of its sound discretion may decree in order to
do substantial justice between the parties when one of them holds
property which in justice and equity should be possessed by the other
in whole or in part. They are two of the multitude of devices which
lend flexibility to the rule of law. The knowledgeable attorney will
appreciate that their scope and limitations are not always precise.
Therein lies their value as tools of equity.
... See cases cited note 155 supra."'Jackson v. Thompson, 214 N.C. 539, 543, 200 S.E. 16, 18 (1938).
... Martha v. Curby, 90 N.Y. 378 (1882), quoted in Sprinkle v. Wellborn,
140 N.C. 163, 177, 52 S.E. 666, 671 (1905).
... Michael v. Moore, 157 N.C. 462, 468, 73 S.E. 104, 106 (1911).
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